Defense (DoD) began its Fast Track Program that encouraged firms to find substantial outside non-SBIR-Program financing early in their research projects. Obtaining such funds to combine with the government SBIR funding qualified the project for the "fast track" of a high priority for the more substantial second stage (Phase II) SBIR funding that followed the initial relatively low-budget research in the first stage (Phase I) of the project. A version of this paper is also available as a part of a collection of papers that examine the DoD's Fast Track Program. In that form, the paper is available from the National Academy of Sciences as: 
Summary
This paper provides case studies for fourteen research and development (R&D) projects funded in thirteen New England companies by the Department of Defense (DoD) Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program. The performance of the six Fast Track projects, each conducted by a different company, is compared with the performance of eight non-Fast Track projects. In 1996, the Department of Defense (DoD) began its Fast Track Program that encouraged firms to find substantial outside non-SBIR-Program financing early in their research projects. Obtaining such funds to combine with the government SBIR funding qualified the project for the "fast track" of a high priority for the more substantial second stage (Phase II) SBIR funding that followed the initial relatively low-budget research in the first stage (Phase I) of the project. The primary conclusions from the study of the New England cases are:
1) The collection of fourteen New England SBIR projects studied here exhibited at the outset of Phase I high risk-both technical and market risk, high capital costs, and often a long-time expected before commercialization of the resulting technology.
2) In the absence of the SBIR funding, the research projects would not have been undertaken in the same way or at the same pace. Outside investors, at the outset of Phase I, would have required too high a rate of return to make it possible for the project to proceed with private financing only.
3) The projects on the whole, both Fast Track and non-Fast Track projects, met both the funding agency's mission and the company's strategy. All fit the general scenario for socially valuable research projects that would have been underfunded in the absence of the SBIR Program. In particular, the projects appear to be ones for which the private rates of return in the absence of SBIR funding would have fallen short of the private hurdle rate required by outside financiers to whom the small businesses would have had to turn for financial support. Yet the social rates of returns to the projects are large and exceed the hurdle rates. The funding from the SBIR program changes the ordering of rates of return anticipated at the outset of Phase I. With the SBIR program providing funds, the expected private return relative to just the private portion of the total project costs is sufficient to move the private rate of return above the hurdle rate, and then the socially valuable research investment is undertaken. 4) Taken as a group the Fast Track projects show higher prospective expected lowerbound social rates of return-a measure that is based upon expected profits to the innovator and other producers benefiting from the innovation.
5) The average duration of additional development beyond Phase II and before commercialization is somewhat less for the Fast Track projects, suggesting that at least on average they are somewhat closer to commercialization at the end of Phase II than the non-Fast Track projects.
6) The respondents were unanimous in their appreciation of the SBIR Program and in their belief that the program generally works well. They did have several recommendations to improve the working of the program, and those recommendations are listed in this paper. Among other things, the respondents cautioned that the Fast Track program is often simply not useful for companies pursuing socially valuable highrisk research, because at the end of Phase I, such projects often do not yet have the characteristics of projects that allow outside private investors to be attracted. 7) In summary, the SBIR Program has funded innovative projects with high social rates of return that would not have been undertaken in the absence of the Program; further, the non-Fast Track as well as the Fast Track projects appear to be quite valuable, although they typically do not exhibit private commercial potential as quickly as the Fast Track projects. John T. Scott
I. Introduction.
As part of a National Academy of Science study of the Department of Defense (DoD) Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program, six SBIR Fast Track projects from six companies in New England are studied here along with SBIR non-Fast Track projects from different New England companies matched by similar location, size, and project duration. A total of seven projects from six non-Fast Track companies are studied-one project for each of five companies and two for the sixth. Additionally, the study includes a non-Fast Track project of a thirteenth company, Foster-Miller, which is much larger than the other companies in the sample and has been successful with an unusually large number of SBIR awards. In all, the study covers fourteen projects at the thirteen firms shown in Table 1 . All of the SBIR projects studied were awarded both Phase I and Phase II funding. The goal of the study is to describe the SBIR projects and compare the Fast Track projects with the non-Fast Track projects, determining the effect that Fast Track has had on SBIR performance and firm behavior. The fourteen projects are high-risk research projects performed by small businesses, or with Foster-Miller in the sample, what the technology literature calls SMEs-small and medium sized enterprises. The study finds that these risky SBIRfunded projects have high prospective, expected social rates of return. The social rates of return are calculated as lower bounds based solely on anticipated innovative investment profits for companies rather than on the sum of those profits (producers' surplus) and consumers' surplus (economists' measure of the value above and beyond what they actually pay that consumers receive from a product or service). Thus, the study's finding that the Fast Track projects as a group have higher social rates of return supports the perception that their prospects for generating profits for innovating firms are especially good. However, some non-Fast Track projects have higher lower-bound expected social rates of return than some Fast Track projects despite the fact that consumer surplus is not measured. Fast Track and non-Fast Track projects alike have lower-bound social rates of return exceeding the private rates of return in the absence of SBIR funding. Each of the studied projects is the type of research project in which the market would fail to invest in a socially valuable innovation in the absence of SBIR or similar public funding. For the fourteen New England SBIR projects studied, the average value of the lower bound for the prospective (that is, at the start of Phase I) expected social rate of return is estimated to be sixty percent. The estimate would be much higher if consumer surplus could be measured.
II. History of the Firms and the Projects.
Table 2 provides some background information about the thirteen companies as a group. The sampled firms have similar histories in the ways reviewed in the table, except that the Fast Track respondents are less likely to have had a previous SBIR award. Not surprisingly, the companies are not Advanced Technology Program (ATP) award winners; the ATP projects require substantial contribution of private funds from the outset of the projects. As seen below, the sampled companies are typically small businesses facing severe capital constraints for internal financing of research. Somewhat more than half of the respondents indicated locational advantages. A variety of other competitive advantages were cited; representative examples include: "large patent base," "patented core technologies," "small and lean," "twenty five years experience in the underlying technology," "trade secrets and know-how." As seen in detail below, the research projects on the whole are characterized by both high technical risk and high market risk. At the outset of Phase I, there is considerable uncertainty about whether the research will resolve outstanding technical problems. Furthermore, the acquisition plans of DoD are not typically firm at the outset of the research, and although potential for spillovers to the non-military commercial sector is present, many uncertainties remain about the form of the non-military applications and about the market success of those applications. Table 3 lists the companies along with the titles of the SBIR projects studied in this paper along with their Fast Track status. The following paragraphs are brief overviews of the technologies being created by the sampled SBIR projects, along with discussion about the relationship of the project to the mission of the funding agency and to the strategy of the company. Brock-Rogers Surgical. Development of a Force-Reflecting Laparoscopic Telemanipulator. Fast Track. The technology merges electronics, mechanics, computer networking and software to create a tele-robot to be used for surgery. The technology allows the surgeon to feel as if he or she were one inch tall and inside the patient. DoD is interested in such computer augmented remote connections to allow medical personnel to operate on the front-lines from remote locations. Beyond the military applications, such technology will change the face of surgery. A deep infrastructure technology is being created-a sophisticated electronic, mechanical, software networked machine. In that sense, the technology is an enabling technology with wide applications outside of medicine. The robot used in robotics no longer needs to "see"-recognition and reception problems are handled by the human controlling the process.
Cape Cod Research, Inc. Multilayer Capacitors Based Upon Engineered Conducting Polymers. Non-Fast Track. The technology uses electrically conductive polymers to store energy to power electric cars. The project involves developing novel and useful materials, and it provides the funding agency with improved energy storage for a variety of applications.
Foster-Miller, Inc. Tunable Sting Net. Non-Fast Track The technology is the latest in a line of "NETS"-nonlethal entanglement technology systems-developed as SBIR projects by Foster-Miller in response to DoD's interest in funding research about "capture mechanics." The family of nets developed by Foster-Miller are compact, lightweight, far-ranging, fast, and can be fired from conventional weapons. The "Sting Net" delivers a remotely controlled electric charge for use with especially aggressive targets and is anticipated to have military applications only. Less physically active versions range from nets that simply entangle to nets using pepper irritant powder to subdue more dangerous targets. The less harsh nets will have use in non-military police operations. The Sting Net project fits with Foster-Miller's highly successful corporate strategy of inventing and licensing patented technologies, spinning off subsidiary companies to manufacture and market the innovations. Numerous SBIR projects have contributed to that strategy, although the company gets only about twenty to twenty-five percent of its revenues from the SBIR awards.
Hyperion Catalysis International. Ultracapacitors Based on Nano-fiber Electrodes. Fast Track. Electrochemical capacitors, sometimes called ultracapacitors or supercapacitors, are being developed for potential applications in hybrid electric vehicles and other automotive electronic and military systems. To be cost and weight effective compared to batteries, these "supercaps" must have adequate energy and power with a long life cycle and meet cost targets. Hyperion has a proprietary line of nano-fibers that have desirable properties and a cost advantage over competing materials. During Phase I the Hyperion nano-fibers showed great promise regarding their power and now in Phase II the nano-fibers are being used to design, fabricate and test electrochemical capacitors. Hyperion would make the nano-fiber electrodes and sell them to the manufacturers of supercaps. Beyond the potential for a large commercial market for supercaps and the fact that the military has specialized needs for them that explain the DoD funding of the research, there are other potential applications including uses in boom boxes, electric motor starters, defibrillation medical devices, and in cell phones in combination with batteries where power from a small supercap can allow the use of a smaller battery and a better product than results using a large battery alone.
Lithium Energy Associates, Inc. Lithium Copper Chloride Inorganic Electrolyte Battery for More Electric Aircraft Systems. Non-Fast Track. The batteries developed by Lithium Energy Associates are rechargeable and have high energy density and extraordinary low-temperature performance. They have military applications in small, light-weight, remote-controlled reconnaissance aircraft equipped with TV cameras and in solar planes that fly to high altitudes, charge during the day, and then keep flying at night. The batteries have other military applications as well; for example, after using conventional power to get equipment to a battlefield, the engines could be turned off and the batteries could reposition vehicles quietly and without infrared detection. The batteries will have applications for a variety of military electronics applications such as radios. The low-temperature performance for the batteries also makes them the potential power source for applications in space, such as powering robot stations on the moon or Mars, and research in progress will push the low-temperature capabilities of the batteries into the range making them suitable for lunar or Mars missions. Customers, apart from DoD and NASA, should include original equipment manufacturers of military electronics or civilian police equipment.
Materials Technology Corporation. Life Prediction of Aging Aircraft Wiring
Systems. Non-Fast Track. The technology developed allows safe, accurate, and efficient diagnostic tests of the wiring in airplanes to ensure that the wiring is defect free. With the current technology the inspector opens a panel door and examines bundles of wires with the naked eye. If the twelve to eighteen inch section of wire that can be seen looks okay, then the entire wire is judged to be safe. In some cases, the inspector may use a mirror to try to look at the back side of the wires; but because of visibility and space limitations it is rare that the back side is inspected well. The wires themselves are rarely a problem; instead, the insulation on the wires is what degrades, becoming brittle with age it begins to crack. The plasticizer vaporizes and with time insulation degrades, becomes brittle and begins to fall apart, exposing bare wire; if two wires are exposed a short circuit is possible. The new technology developed by Materials Technology Corporation is the first approach to inspecting for damaged insulation of wiring that allows viewing all sides of the wiring and does not risk damaging the wires as typically occurs if the wires are bent or disturbed in trying to examine their back side. The technology uses embedded optical sensors in a device that can be put around the bundle of wires and used to get a 360 degree view of the wires. The information gathered by the handheld device is signaled to a computer that pinpoints and displays precisely where on the 360 degree surface a crack is located. New optical imaging technology is used. With the press of a button the image can be recorded, and the data transported for use at other sites. It is expected that the system will allow the entire wiring history of the aircraft to be stored on a zip drive that will be carried in the aircraft. Planes will not have to return to a home base to be inspected and repaired. Historical data, supplemented with a visible image will allow the inspector to see what the wiring looked like at the last inspection and calculate the progression of changes. In addition to examining aircraft wires and cable, the technology can be used to examine the connections and to detect corrosion more generally in aircraft and other objects. There are many applications beyond the applications for military and commercial aircraft. The optical scanning procedure is expected to be relevant for dealing with vision problems caused by macular degeneration. And, of course, what is good for aircraft inspection is also good for inspecting bridges and other infrastructure.
Mide Technology Corporation. Development of Distributed Area Averaging Sensor. Non-Fast Track. The technology eliminates harmful vibrations in structures using active materials that respond to stimuli; for example, if voltage is applied the active material expands or contracts. The vibrations of structures have several natural frequencies, and the technology developed by Mide Technology Corporation uses shaped sensors to filter out noise, focusing on a desired frequency to eliminate the associated vibrations. The area averaging sensor simplifies a higher dimension multiple-input multiple-output information problem to a lower dimension control system that characterizes more simply the necessary information about the natural frequencies causing vibrations despite a complex set of underlying information. The frequencies that really transmit the noise through the structure of interest can be isolated using a control system with active fiber composite actuators; the smart material is used to simplify the control problem and ultimately allow the elimination of the vibrations in the structure. The immediate application of the technology is to protect launch satellites from damage from structural vibrations. Alternatively, one could protect the launch satellite with blankets-thin ones to protect against high frequency noise, and thick ones to protect against lower frequency noise. The Mide technology is the active way of dealing with the problem. Commercial potential extends beyond the protection from vibration of components in space launch vehicles. The commercial potential comes from using area average sensors with flexible circuitry, and Mide has four commercial products using that technology. The products range from generic technology such as sensors on a flexible circuitry for signal conditioning, a high voltage amplifier to drive active fiber composites, and sensors connected in various ways on a small matrix board, to a specific application that uses sensors on a the shaft of a golf club to detect club head speed and provide feedback. The generic applications are in military uses such as protecting a launch of a space craft or quieting torpedoes in a submarine to non-military commercial applications such as vibration control for the blades of a gas turbine or control of vibrations in air conditioning ducts. Anything that vibrates and has a dynamics problem with the vibration and noise can potentially benefit from the technology.
Optigain, Inc. Single Longitudinal Mode Distributed Feedback Fiber Optics Laser. Non-Fast Track. Optigain's technology provides a fiber version of a signal source which is similar to a semiconductor laser. Optigain's fiber laser is a distributed laser induced in a fiber rather than a semiconductor. Transmission systems need a high quality signal source, and Optigain's technology provides a narrow, high-quality low-noise laser that can potentially capture some of the market for semiconductor lasers used in communications markets. The company's strategy is to develop various fiber-based devices, and the product here is a fiber-based component that can be put into other systems. Several lasers, each a different wavelength, have been developed, and the communications markets where Optigain's fiber-based laser will be preferred over the semiconductor lasers are being sought. The better performance for the fiber-based laser is in the line width of the laser and its spectral purity. The superior performance should lead to applications in sensor markets as well. Regarding the relationship between the project and the mission of the funding agency, in this case the agency was quite open about different topics, with awards going to further technology for high-speed communications networks quite generally. The goal of the funding was to enable new technologies for such networks, and the concern was with the overall strength of the solutions rather than a specific set of narrow requirements. John T. Scott QSource, Inc. Multiple Rectangular Discharge CO 2 Laser. Fast Track. QSource's CO 2 laser technology generates high power and efficiency and has specialized military uses. There are also non-military commercial uses with large market potential. QSource's product features a higher power laser, smaller size, and an advantage in cost. CO 2 lasers are used in laser radar; a laser pulse bounces off an object. The laser is highly sensitive, allowing identification of detailed information about a tank or an aircraft many miles away. The laser system along with a DC battery source can be built in the size of a small suitcase. The CO 2 laser has very high efficiency, transmitting substantial distances with very little power loss; it is compact, uses a simple gas, and very efficient. The technology is dual-use technology; the basic transmitter unit in a laser radar has uses for heating, cutting, and trimming for example, with one of the lasers used in eye surgery having been developed initially in another DoD SBIR project trying to track objects at great distance. The laser is inherently sterile, so for cutting tissue it is ideal. It can be used for cutting teeth, working on teeth as well as a mechanical drill. It is more expensive than a drill, but it does not have the risk of transmitting hepatitis or other viruses. A laser dental system has a detachable head in the optical system that delivers the laser and is easy to clean. The surgery is painless; there is no need for anesthesia. The dental market alone over the next ten years is projected to sell 100,000 dental laser systems once the procedure for hard tissue is approved. A CO 2 laser dental system will sell for about $20,000. The energetic CO 2 lasers that QSource technology improves upon should have a market of $2 billion in the dental market alone. The medical therapeutics uses include the dental applications, skin resurfacing, microsurgery in the ear, and other applications. Further markets are identified for sealed off CO 2 lasers in materials processing and various research uses. There are a large number of CO 2 lasers available, and over the last decade they have become more functionally useful, and the cost of producing them in terms of dollars per watt is not great. More of the product cost is in the cost of the basic power source needed to energize the laser. The power supply is more than half the cost of the laser-the basic laser itself rather than the entire system. The big advance provided by QSource technology is to reduce the cost of the power supply. Some of the older technology can achieve the level of efficiency achieved by the new QSource rectangular discharge laser, but those technologies result in products that are very big and not very sturdy.
SEA CORP (Systems Engineering Assoc. Corp.). Rapid Prototype Portable
Combat and Launch System. Non-Fast Track. The technology is a software based fire control system that allows a submarine to fire various types of torpedoes. On a modern submarine, the systems are not compatible with all torpedoes. SEA CORP has created a system in a suitcase that can be plugged in and allow the submarine to use different types of torpedoes. Second project also discussed: Modular Gas Generator Launch Canister. Non-Fast Track. This technology developed by SEA CORP is a launcher for torpedoes that uses automotive air bag technology rather than a conventional gas system. It is modular, environmentally friendly, and uses a commercial off-the-shelf item to meet a specialized military purpose. Other commercial applications of both technologies are being considered, and the technologies will allow SEA CORP to diversify its activities into profitable new lines of business that are very different from its historical focus. John T. Scott Spectra Science Corp. Quantum Dots: Next Generation of Electronic Phosphors. Fast Track. The technology centers on better phosphor that results in a brighter image on large screen projections. The technology combines the three core technologies of Spectra Science. First, the company has laser paint technology using disordered lasers. Conventional lasers use mirrors as the gain source, but laser paints use scatters like Titanium particles. So a composite system is used to create the gain source; the laser excites the material and the feedback is not from mirrors, but instead from materials. The laser paint technology is used to identify or to authenticate, for example, via a label on a fabric or in a document. The second core technology came from Phase I of this SBIR award. In that research, Spectra developed the ability to make smaller phosphor particles with surfaces for the composite systems that could exhibit gain and could be used in a laser paint. The difficulty to be surmounted was that the surfaces of the particles have a large number of defect sites. The laser is supposed to excite the particles and give light back, rather than having trap sites on the material's surface where defects in the surface trap the light and prevent emission of light. The third core technology is the focus of the SBIR project's Phase II. It is a combination of the first two technologies. Phase I had resulted in quantum dot phosphors for display applications, better phosphors that could be driven harder with the result of a brighter image. Phase II then shifted gears and focused on developing what had been discovered. Spectra Science has now developed a new approach to large screen projection systems. The phosphors are excited and emit higher energies than previously. With previous technologies, large screen projections can be viewed only in the dark. Spectra Science has merged their work on display technologies and materials for laser paints to develop a lasing projection system. The detailed work on the surfaces of materials used to create gain with lasers has applications in projection technology. DoD's SBIR award here meets their mission in terms of improved large screen projection systems' images. That goal remained the same even when Phase II was refocused. And the project clearly satisfies Spectra Science's strategic mission of seeking potential applications for its core technologies. Synkinetics, Inc. High Precision Gimbal System. Fast Track. The Synkinetics technology is an innovative system of gears that provide cost-effective, precision, sturdy devices for positioning and pointing armaments. Such devices are used, for example, in missile control systems. Synkinetics's new speed conversion technology improves current high-precision pointing and positioning transmission equipment at a reasonable cost. The technology features flat-plate cam gears in an in-line mechanism that combines the rolling aspects of bearings with the transmission aspects of gears to obtain a versatile, robust, compact, reduced-weight, high-precision, efficient and cost-effective drive mechanism. The technology is generic and has countless applications. The transmissions will have uses for pointing and precision positioning of various payloads for industry and the military. Applications of reliable, low cost and low maintenance precision positioners are expected in the medical, electronics, marine, mobile satellite communications, and aerospace industries.
Yardney Technical Products, Inc. Low Cost, Lightweight, Rechargeable Lithium-ion Batteries. Fast Track. Yardney has developed the battery using the prismatic cell technology identified in Phase I of the project and plans to deliver a prototype to its sponsoring agency. The battery developed has a 25 percent improvement in capacity compared to the battery that the military now uses and would represent a major jump in performance for the DoD uses for the particular style of battery. The market for the Lithium-ion battery has grown rapidly from nothing in 1990 to reach current sales of $1.2 billion. Currently the market is growing at thirty percent a year, and there is much opportunity for new technologies. The technology will be useful to other governments; with approval sales to armies of U.S. allies are expected. Non-military commercial applications are expected as well.
III. The Companies' Expectations for the SBIR Projects and the Reasons SBIR Support Was Needed.
As Table 4 shows, the SBIR awards made possible research that otherwise would not have been undertaken or would have been done on a smaller scale at a slower pace. The awards are expected to expand the businesses of the SBIR winners. To the question, "Would the company have undertaken the research without the SBIR award?", representative comments included the following ones paraphrased from the interviews.
No, to support our Phase I project, we tried to find support from other companies and venture capitalists. The venture capitalists want too high a rate of return and want returns too quickly. Joint ventures don't work either. You need their money, so they want lots of rights. You must sell your soul to them. These partner companies are providing capital basically and sometimes distribution networks.
No, working on a particular DoD program enabled us to do further work on our technology and gain insight into commercialization. The SBIR project is an incubation period of sorts to new start-up companies with new technology, an innovative way of approaching a problem. After the SBIR project, the development work that remains is a reorientation of the technology, looking at how to manufacture and commercialize for nonmilitary applications, to come up with a low-cost way to mass produce for less sophisticated requirements. But at the outset, the SBIR award is the lifeblood of new entrepreneurial ventures when new technology is to be advanced. We came up with something worthwhile for DoD, but we also advanced our own technology to another level without going crazy looking for outside investors. The lessons learned in the SBIR project provide the data base that allows us to extrapolate intelligently and succeed in non-military, commercial applications of our technology.
We would have devoted some resources to the project, but it is questionable whether we would have gotten this far. We would have sought assistance from other companies and from universities. We would have proceeded on a smaller scale and sought a partner down the road.
No, there is no guarantee that such high risk research will pan out. And the SBIR program understands that , and it therefore requires not necessarily a commercial product, but instead a good effort. It understands that in many cases the value will be to prove the technological approach taken is not the right path. So the [funding agency within DoD] will not go down that path again. In fact, in the case of our award, [the funding agency] gave two awards. So, it spends $1.5 million on two projects running parallel, and the probability of at least one success is increased. We'll have a cookoff . . . with the other company to see which box is the better one to go with.
Probably not. We have no means of acquiring capital except through loans or from investors. But being honest with them, we could not raise the necessary funds-at least not at the outset of the SBIR projects. DoD does not select its highest priority acquisition projects to develop through the SBIR Program. Instead, it uses projects that are interesting and have great potential value and the possibility for acquisition. But they are lower priority, high risk projects. It is difficult to attract outside investment for such projects. These are projects for which we could not show an outside investor definite acquisition plans. If we could, DoD would not use the SBIR Program to fund the projects. The SBIR projects are ones for which the acquisition plans are fuzzy.
No, we would not have done the project without the SBIR award. We devote about six percent of our income to research. This would not have been a project to get those funds. Without SBIR help, our research would have been more near-term and less challenging. Table 5 shows the reasons why the SBIR funding was needed. The projects entailed substantial technical and market risks, and the projects required substantial amounts of capital from the perspective of the small businesses doing the research. Many respondents are clearly concerned about the possibilities for opportunistic behavior by sources of external financing in the early stages of the research that the SBIR program funds. On the other hand, once the small business can finance their early stage research and have moved beyond the initial research and development stage, they are on whole comfortable with the degree to which they can protect their property rights. Whether from patent protection, or from carefully negotiated licensing agreements, despite the fact that the firms do not typically anticipate capturing all of the profits that their research will create, they do expect to capture a sufficient amount of those profits to make their investments worthwhile. Table 5 focuses on the reasons that the companies would not have been able to carry out the research without public funding. Although of course the SBIR program is not expected to change the technical risk or change opportunistic behavior, as explained subsequently, it increases the private expected rate of return above the private hurdle rate. With the public funding, despite the risks, the firm will undertake the research.
In addition to their comments accompanying Table 4 , respondents offered further insights about their needs for SBIR funding when discussing the list of reasons in Table  5 . For example, the difficulties faced by small businesses when raising funds from large corporations or venture capitalists are reflected in the following comments that were made when discussing opportunistic behavior.
In one of our earlier SBIR projects, after we had used Phase I for risk reduction we became convinced that the technology would work, but then only after we had a patent were we willing to approach the large companies for a partnership. A small business needs to have a patent in hand in our area of technology. The big companies, in our area, will say: We do not sign nondisclosure agreements with small companies.
The eighth reason, opportunistic behavior is also important. It is what kills Fast Tracks. The outside partner wants to claim rights to the technology. That is what killed our Fast Track. It did not fly because our partner wanted more complete rights. The outside partner would provide one-third of the money but wanted over one-half of the rights.
The second of the two comments is different from the first. The first comment reflects the concern that the outsider will steal the small business's intellectual property and use it for its own purposes. The second comment reflects the fact that because the SBIR projects are high risk projects, outside investors demand very high expected rates of return. Many comments like the second comment were made when the interviews turned explicitly to discussion of outside finance, and those comments are reported subsequently. Tassey (1997) and Link and Scott (1998) .
**If a respondent ranks a reason first, that counts for 8 points, second implies 7 points, and so on down to eighth which would count 1 point. However, if a respondent ranks, say, only three reasons, then only those three reasons would receive any rank-weighted score-they would receive eight, seven, and six points respectively, while all other reasons would receive zero points. Thus, if 10 respondents ranked the first reason most important, and 2 ranked it second, while 1 respondent ranked it fourth, the rank weighted score for the first reason would be 8x10 + 7x2 + 5x1 = 99. Ties split evenly the points assigned for the number of tied reasons. For example, if two reasons tied for first for a respondent, then each would receive scores of 7.5. Finally, note that the rank-weighted scores for the sample of six Fast Track companies should be multiplied by 7/6 to make them comparable with the rank-weighted scores from the sample of seven nonFast Track companies.
IV. The Companies' Plans for Future SBIR Proposals.
Because of the barriers to complete private funding of small business innovation research that are emphasized in Table 5 , all of the small businesses plan to apply for SBIR awards in the future to support additional high-risk research. Table 6 shows that fact and also notes the range of responses to the question of whether previous awards were important for winning the current award. There are two issues here. One is a substantive issue of whether the technology pursued in the present award has evolved from technology developed in previous awards. For some firms, past awards were not directly relevant to the present one, but for others the current award was for further development of technology developed with earlier SBIR awards. A second issue is a procedural one-would the fact that SBIR awards were won previously have affected the chances, ceteris paribus, for winning the current award. For many respondents there was no general perception among the respondents that their chances were affected one way or the other by having won previous awards, apart from the substantive benefits when the technologies were linked and evolving sequentially through time as new SBIR projects were begun. However, a couple of respondents expressed views that previous awards sometimes can reduce a company's chances for winning subsequent awards. Responses about the impact of earlier awards include the following comments illustrating views about positive and negative effects.
Yes, previous success is a very, very negative factor. Managers of the SBIR program at the highest levels are frustrated by what they perceive as the lack of "success" stories from their program. They have difficulty accepting that their definition of success (commercializing of products from a SBIR program) is an extremely unlikely outcome given the structure of the SBIR program. Thus, there is a built in bias to award Phase IIs to small companies who already have in place commercial successes not supported by the SBIR program and for which they can take credit. These companies are very rare because they normally do not participate in the SBIR program.
With the Fast Track Program, there is a two-tier standard favoring firms new to the SBIR program, with 25% cost-sharing for a new company and 100% cost-sharing for companies like us.
Previous awards helped us; we learned what the funding agencies' needs were. We learned that to have a successful proposal, we need to understand what is wanted by the agency. Previous SBIR awards helped us learn how to have a successful proposal.
Responses to the question about future applications for SBIR awards (Do you anticipate applying for SBIR awards in the future? Why?) include the following and reflect the reasons that innovative small businesses are enthusiastic about the SBIR Program.. Yes, although the developments for the military from the SBIR awards will not be directly applicable for non-military, commercial products, indirectly the non-military technology is being advanced. While coming up with something worthwhile for DoD, we also advance our own nonmilitary commercial technology to a higher level without going crazy looking for outside investors. The lessons learned in these SBIR projects provide the data base that allows us to extrapolate intelligently. The SBIR Program makes it possible for us to learn and develop our technology. The program is fantastic for young vibrant entrepreneurs.
Yes, it's the only way to keep the lights on given the high risk and high capital costs for the research we are doing as we try to get into a different technology. Our existing line of business generates very little revenue and we cannot fund R&D ourselves. For the type of research we are doing, neither venture capitalists nor large companies will work as sources of outside funding. Both the venture capitalists and the large companies want too high a rate of return-too many rights to the future returns relative to the investment they would make in our company.
Yes, because we have created an efficient infrastructure to generate prototypes in response to requests for Phase I and Phase II proposals.
Yes, selectively. We've got a pilot line now, so we are beyond the SBIR type project in our current work. Maybe we will find a wrinkle appropriate for another SBIR project in our current technology.
Yes, the SBIR Program is the way to get funds for truly innovative highrisk small business projects that cannot effectively be financed by outside private funds given the opportunistic behavior by companies or lack of understanding of the technology by venture capitalists. John T. Scott Right now, we're in the midst of Phase II, so no immediate plans. But, yes, because the SBIR Program gives us the ability to develop a technology we would not have been able to develop on our own given the technical risk and capital costs and the long time from initial research until commercialization.
Yes, we like the challenge and broad scope of the topics.
Yes, our DoD customers have identified several areas where our technology can be developed further and applied to their needs.
Had it not been for this Phase I, neither we nor the [sponsoring agency] would have been at this stage. We believe we can make similar breakthroughs with future SBIR awards.
Yes, the SBIR awards help us research new technologies given technical risk and the risk of opportunistic behavior by large companies if we go to them with our ideas before they are developed.
Yes, SBIR awards let us accept the risk of good projects.
Yes, the SBIR Program has been very successful for us. It has allowed us to develop a product line for eventual commercialization and growth of our company. The new product line will be more profitable than our existing product lines. We understand the SBIR Program is a start-up program, not intended to be used over and over. But it allows us to do high risk research with commercial potential and to expand our business into new product lines.
V. The Companies' Commercialization Plans. Table 7 shows the ranges of responses about commercialization plans across the projects. Also shown is the range of responses regarding the use of patents and scientific papers that help to disseminate technology as well as protect rights to intellectual property. The patents can of course help to create and protect intellectual property rights, while the papers disseminate information and may even bolster the effectiveness of patent rights by making ancillary non-patented materials common knowledge that cannot be the basis for competing patents. Finally, discussion revealed that the respondents see their SBIR funded research in a different light from their other technologies with commercial potential. On the whole, the projects are different, entailing more technical and market risk, and they are not generally the sort of research projects that the companies would have pursued without SBIR support. Not surprisingly, then, the respondents report that commercialization plans are different than what would have been the case without SBIR support. On the other hand, given that the SBIR project has proven the commercial potential for what was an extraordinarily risky project at the start of Phase I, the firms often report that with the commercial potential now established, the commercialization plans look very much as they would for any project that had reached the stage of making prototypes and gearing up for production. Nonetheless, it is also true that in many cases the respondents are in the position of needing a "Phase III" to provide the bridge from highly promising technology with great commercial potential to successful development of the manufacturing technology and the final product for the market.
Of course, as seen in Table 4 , without the SBIR program, the research projects would typically not have been as close to commercial results, because the projects would not have been undertaken or would have proceeded in a different way. However, here the respondents commented further about not only the delay that might have resulted, and also they often discussed here the remaining difficulties that they faced as they looked for financial support for additional periods of development before commercializing their technology. Table 7 . Commercialization Plans.
The number of projects for the indicated category Respondents' comments here about the impact of the SBIR award on commercialization plans included the following.
I was an academic. I never, never would have done this commercialization research without the SBIR Program. The SBIR Program spawned a development that would not have happened in the same time frame, and the development will result in commercialization.
We never would have gotten this far; we would not have taken the $100K look [in Phase I]. We would have put this project aside to work on something else. The SBIR award allowed us to take a six month look at a promising idea. We got some good results, and we can now justify a million dollar investment ourselves.
Without the SBIR Program, we would have at a slower pace tried to bring the technology along so far, to a point, and then we would have tried to generate interest to bring in a partner. But without the SBIR award, we would not have been so far along.
The SBIR Program let us develop our own technology while we created something worthwhile for DoD. We will be able to use the understanding and data we developed in significant ways to further our commercial, nonmilitary technology.
We would not have done the project without SBIR, but if we had done the project, our commercial plans would be the same.
The SBIR Program put us in a position to develop this new product.
Assuming that we could have gotten to this point without SBIR, our commercialization plans would have been the same. But we could not have gotten to this point without SBIR. The technology was too unproven. The SBIR Program was willing to take the risk when alternative sources of investment funding were not available.
VI. The Companies' Perceptions of the Relationship between the SBIR Award and
Private Third-Party Financing. Table 8 shows that the Fast Track program does address what most respondents see as a difficult period for SBIR projects-namely the gap between Phase I and Phase II funding. Both Fast Track and non-Fast Track respondents emphasize the difficulties created by the gap; employees must be paid and the project kept afloat and progressing from the Phase I stage, yet many small businesses, for the reasons discussed above, find it very difficult to acquire financing while waiting for a Phase II award. The effectiveness of the Fast Track Program in this regard is clear from Table 8 , since the Fast Track winners did not report "gap" difficulties on their Fast Track projects. Table 8 also shows that winning an SBIR award (for our sample of projects that all won Phase II awards) facilitated attracting outside financing to further commercialization of the technology developed under the SBIR project in the perceptions of most Fast Track respondents. With one exception, the non-Fast Track respondents did not find that the SBIR award helped them to secure outside funds. This reflects the difference in prospects for commercialization early in the SBIR-funded research of Fast Track projects as compared with non-Fast Track projects. Comments of the respondents about the financing issues and their relationship to the SBIR award included the following.
One Fast Track respondent reported: During the Phase I, there was full funding by the government, but beyond that we have had one-to-one matching. Although we did not use the SBIR award as a marketing tool to attract outside funding, when we went to an investor the award was part of the whole package. The matching funds to go with the outside investor's funds were there, so yes, that helped.
Another Fast Track respondent said: Yes, the SBIR award was used as leverage, as a marketing tool. That is when it is most helpful. Having the SBIR Fast Track award and the financing it helped attract served as a bridge between Phase I and Phase II; the gap between Phase I and Phase II was eliminated.
A non-Fast Track respondent observed: There was an eight month delay [between Phase I and Phase II]. This allowed our competitors . . . to take our work and get a head start on improvements. This left us in a difficult position when the Phase II was eventually awarded.
The same non-Fast Track respondent said: Personal friends seem the best source of outside financing for us. The SBIR award is not a useful marketing tool because most investors do not wish copies of proposals, Phase I final reports and Phase II progress reports, wandering over the desks of unknown reviewers. Some agencies use outside reviewers who take the best ideas and have their graduate students pursue them. This practice is not supposed to happen, but is the rule rather than the exception.
Another non-Fast Track respondent said: After Phase I ends, you have trained people and your staff is waiting around. You are holding your breath until Phase II begins and the needed funds are available.
Another non-Fast Track respondent commented about the gap between Phase I and Phase II in this way: Considering the public's $750,000 investment, the rights demanded are acceptable; the processing takes a little longer than it should; by the time reports are submitted for Phase I, four months go by. That gap is not a problem for a large corporation, but for us a gap that lasts well over a quarter and probably six months in the end, is a problem. But overall the process works well.
Another non-Fast Track respondent stated: We used internal funds only. We did not consider using Fast Track. That would have required an outside investor. But the project is a high risk project and DoD's acquisition plans are not yet clear. It is highly unlikely that we could get the outside investors required for Fast Track. At the end of Phase II it would be possible to get outside investors, but not at any time prior to that and not even now. Fast Track is a good idea in theory, but in execution there is a problem. At the end of Phase I, a company typically has just a concept. Later when there is a prototype, then you can do something with outside investors.
Another non-Fast Track respondent said: In a small business setting, we are wrapped up in technological issues and production issues and decisions about how to market our product. It would not be productive to get into the specialized activity of fund raising given the circumstances. There must be somebody willing to put money into the project. Plenty of people will give lip service to the idea and take your time. But the probability of actually getting the money is less than five percent. To spend eighty percent of the time for the five percent chance of financial support is not a good use of our time.
VII. The Companies' Views about the Administration of the SBIR Program.
The respondents report that they are highly satisfied with the SBIR Program; they are overwhelmingly positive in their overall impressions of the program as shown in Table 9 . The responding companies believe that the SBIR Program made it possible for them to do significant research that they otherwise would have been unable to do. They clearly believe that the research has furthered not only their company's strategy but the mission of the sponsoring DoD agency as well. Nonetheless, the companies offered many suggestions for improving the SBIR program, the suggestions for improvement and general concerns that were expressed include the following from the Fast Track companies.
I have no recommendations to improve the program itself, but one recommendation could be made based on the success of my company. I did the technical work, but I brought in others to do the accounting and business administration. The SBIR Program could promulgate information about how to proceed: Small business principals should recognize their strengths and weaknesses, and they should bring someone in to do the administrative work rather than having the scientist having to do it all. The SBIR Program could encourage small businesses to bring in outside expertise to ensure competence in business administration to go along with the competence in the scientific work.
I want to promote the SBIR concept. It provides a wonderful opportunity for us to develop our own technology and at the same time do something worthwhile for DoD. SBIRs are the lifeblood of new entrepreneurial ventures when new technology is to be advanced. We are all appreciative and thankful and grateful that there is this highway that allows us the opportunity to develop our technologies. However, one must remember that there is a dichotomy between requirements of the armed forces and requirements of non-military commercialization. Typically there is very little direct overlap. The military development will often have very costly requirements for high precision, and the results will not often be directly applicable for non-military commercial use, although indirectly the nonmilitary technology is being advanced. One sees a correlation from the program itself into a commercial project, but the commercial project typically will not need to be as sophisticated, as accurate, as costly. It won't need the special materials. One cannot take the thing developed for military use and say it is a commercial product. And, if there are no direct commercialization results, one cannot say the SBIR project failed to pay off. The merits of the SBIR Program should not be defined and based on commercialization. There is a gray area here. There may ultimately be commercial products that might not be obvious. The procedure and testing and designing for DoD is a bulwark for the work that follows in the non-military commercial market, work that follows in nonobvious ways. When and where the experience pays off commercially is not always clear. John T. Scott
The SBIR award did not really help us find our outside financing. We have a sister company that uses the same venture capitalist as the one we have brought into the project, and the coincidence of the venture capitalist interests in the sister company and the research we are pursing allowed us to attract the third party investment. So we were lucky getting the Fast Track designation and priority for a Phase II award. The company with equally good research prospects but no luck finding a financial partner will have lower priority. Why should we have priority just because we were lucky finding a partner for third party investment. The advantage of a Fast Track is that it almost guarantees that you get a Phase II award. Getting a leg up on Phase II is very attractive to us. But there is a problem here if worthwhile projects get low priority because they are either unlucky in seeking outside funding or because they entail research that is not at a stage allowing the small business to attract third-party funds.
I like the SBIR program. It's easy to use. You get early warning on the web. It works. The problems are in the implementation not the program itself. Some RFPs are so detailed, they are clearly written for one firm. Some RFPs no one can understand. Some are simply silly, asking for something that is not doable. But, overall, there is no real problem with the SBIR Program. It works well.
Fast track is a great innovation. One of the lessons I think can be discovered by looking at the solicitations. Projects solicited will include at times requests for work on a very specialized technology that already is in existence and for which an upgrade is solicited. I'm not sure why an upgrade should be needed in many of these cases, but in any case why does such a thing appear under the SBIR program? It looks as if the DoD is using SBIR to get little companies to handle what used to be done with routine R&D and procurement at big companies. Now those companies are out of the defense related business and their former employees are in little companies. It looks like the DoD program solicitation is designed to get the little companies to do what used to be done with DoD procurement. The little companies are perhaps easier to drive a good bargain with, but such projects are not an appropriate use of the SBIR pool of dollars. Fast Track is a great innovation because it takes money out of that pot and puts it into truly innovative small business projects with a high chance of commercialization. The money should be going to finding people with great ideas; lots will crash and burn, but the technology goes into our U.S. technology data bank, and that's where our good jobs come from. Fast track makes good scientific industrial policy based on innovation and technology. It can find the truly innovative projects. The success here comes from experts reviewing proposals for DoD and making judgments better than cigar-chomping venture capitalists who know nothing about technology. Fast track takes money out of the general pot of dollars and gets it away from procurement and to truly innovative people. Fast Track helps the SBIR program work as it should.
It is not clear how to structure the Fast Track partnerships so that they fly. A third party is dumping in hundreds of thousands of dollars, and the partnership includes that third party, the government, and us. It becomes very difficult to negotiate the deal. One suggestion might be for the SBIR Program to incorporate a Phase III focused on manufacturing technology. When Phase II is successfully completed, there is an interesting product. But it is then up to us to get the money for equipment. A Phase III for developing manufacturing technology, for ramping up for production might be quite helpful given the difficulties negotiating the third party investments.
The prospects for commercialization could be improved if the SBIR Program provided funding for a Mentor/Consultant as a part of Phase II. The SBIR firm would identify in the Phase II proposal a large corporation or marketing consulting firm that would work with the SBIR firm during Phase II and provide expertise about commercializing the technology. The small firm knows the technology, but the larger firm that would act as a mentor during Phase II and would be able to help the small firm understand how to market the technology. The big company with the marketing channels and capabilities needed would look at the small company's innovative device and advise it on how to proceed. It would watch the small company and see what was going on and make recommendations and guide the small company, so that at the end of Phase II the small company is not left wondering what to do next. The funding for the Mentor/Consultant need not be an overly large amount. A cross section of the mentoring company would be needed. Someone from marketing, someone from engineering, someone from administration, finance, and management. Three or four people, maybe 100 hours each, to oversee and mentor the small company so that at the end of Phase II they have a direction and a good feel for the market potential and what to do. The SBIR program is now open ended; it is not realizing the fruits of what the program's projects are developing. Providing the opportunity of mentoring from and consulting with a large corporation could improve the prospects for commercialization of SBIR results.
The critical comments from the non-Fast Track respondents were as follows, but again these are all comments made in the context of an overwhelmingly favorable impression of the SBIR Program. The respondents were simply offering these thoughts as ideas that might be used to make a fine program even better.
We participated in earlier versions of the SBIR Program. Fast Track is not useful for us. If we had technology in house during the first few weeks of the Phase I (which we never do), we would not go through the SBIR system at all.
The SBIR program is administered at the top by hard working and well meaning people who are really trying to improve our national technology base. As a suggestion, they might rethink how to best go about this task. We need improvements in certain key technology areas and there is widespread agreement as to which areas. However, we do not need uncoordinated Army, Navy, Air Force, DoE, NSF, and NIH SBIR programs, each trying to achieve the same broad goals. These key technology need areas should be assigned a lead agency which should fund all proposals in this area.
Of the 25 pages in the application, only about five are needed for technical evaluation. The other 20 could be filed separately electronically and be used only in the event the application is being considered for award. This would greatly reduce the complexity of the application process.
The original concept of Phase I followed by Phase II and then Phase II leading to commercialization is probably flawed. I would recommend revising that concept. The SBIR Program could help to complete the process of commercialization. From a successful Phase II project, the SBIR project could go to a stage where the Phase II success is developed further. The SBIR Program could support such a bridge to commercialization. The SBIR Program now is aimed at establishing technical feasibility, not commercial feasibility. A stage subsequent to Phase II with government and the company sharing the costs of continuing development work would be a good policy. Note that it is such sharing of cost for development work that the ATP projects entail. If big companies feel the government needs to help them with such projects, then small businesses need such support too. The Fast Track program is flawed, because the end of Phase I is too soon to be ready to establish commercial potential. Fast Track will drive things toward more implementation rather than research. Such projects in themselves are fine as long as there is a limit on the amount of the SBIR program that goes to support that sort of effort. I would recommend setting a limited percentage of the SBIR funds that could go to Fast Track projects.
One of the biggest problems we have faced is that our program managers are not able to travel to us because of a lack of funding. Along with the funding, include 30 to 50K for the project monitor to do his job with the specific program for which he is the project manager. It would be easier to interact with the DoD manager if the manager could travel to our location. Also, we can spend the funds for Phase II in two years, but to physically accomplish all of our goals takes time. It would help if there were the latitude to make the Phase II projects three or four years in length rather than just two years.
We thought about Fast Track, but it was not right for us. It was too soon in our research to go to outside investors. We're too inexperienced for Fast Track. To use Fast Track, a company must be in a position to negotiate. Then there is a substantial cost for lawyers.
I recommend that the SBIR Program ensure that the technical monitor is involved in the project. When the technical monitor is involved, things go much better than when the technical monitor is not involved.
There is a conceptual problem with Fast Track. The typical SBIR project will not be to the point by the end of Phase I to allow a commitment from an outside investor. Rarely would a venture capitalist think of funding a project unless the research is already done. Such research gets done during Phase II.
Overall the program works very well; things move fairly smoothly.
We did not consider using Fast Track. That would have required an outside investor. But the project is a high risk project and DoD's acquisition plans are not yet clear. It is highly unlikely that we could get the outside investors required for Fast Track. At the end of Phase II it would be possible to get outside investors, but not at any time prior to that and not even now. Fast Track is a good idea in theory, but in execution there is a problem. At the end of Phase I, a company typically has just a concept. Later when there is a prototype, then you can do something with outside investors.
VIII. Estimation of the Lower-Bound Social Rates of Return for the SBIR Projects.
The data gathered during the interview with the 13 respondents allowed the estimation of the private and social rates of return for the 14 projects discussed. The procedure is explained in much greater detail in Link and Scott (1998) and Link and Scott (1999) . Here, let me simply emphasize that these are prospective expected rates of return, even though the estimates of the investment costs are gathered subsequent to the beginning of Phase I (and arguably reflect what would have been the rational expectations for the costs when the project began). That is, the expected rates of return are by the logic of the approach used to calculate them, estimations of the expectation of the rates of return at the time that Phase I began. At that time the SBIR projects were extraordinarily risky; they had upside potential, but also extraordinary downside risk. That is not only because the projects had great technical risks, and not only because of the market riskeven DoD procurement plans are not clear at the beginning of a Phase I SBIR project, but also because of the issues that make it difficult for small businesses to finance innovative investment. Impacted information, moral hazard, potential for opportunistic behavior on both sides of the financial transaction, all combine to result in a market failure. Indeed, we expect an incomplete market here.
The expected rate of return required by the potential outside investor exceeds the rate that the small business is willing to promise for the project, and as a result the small businesses in our samples would not have proceeded with their innovative investments without the support of the SBIR program. Regarding the difficulties of raising outside financial capital, the respondents made the following observations. John T. Scott
We would not agree to sell our soul to the venture capitalists or a large company.
. . . the project is a high risk project and DoD's acquisition plans are not yet clear. It is highly unlikely that we could get the outside investors required for Fast Track.
We would not agree to an arrangement where we would lose control of our company and our intellectual property.
The outside investors wanted half of the rights to profits in return for providing one-third of the financing.
For the type of high-risk research funded by the SBIR Program, a small company cannot go to the large companies with an interest in the projects because in our area of technology the large companies will not sign nondisclosure agreements with small companies. Only after the technical risk has been reduced and a prototype and a patent are in hand would the small company have the ability to negotiate a partnership.
We came up with something worthwhile for DoD, but we also advanced our own technology to another level without going crazy looking for outside investors.
There must be somebody willing to put money into the project. Plenty of people will give lip service to the idea and take your time. But the probability of actually getting the money is less than five percent. To spend eighty percent of the time for the five percent chance of financial support is not a good use of our time.
. . ., to support our Phase I project, we tried to find support from other companies and venture capitalists. The venture capitalists want too high a rate of return and want returns too quickly. Joint ventures don't work either. You need their money, so they want lots of rights. You must sell your soul to them. These partner companies are providing capital basically and sometimes distribution networks.
We cannot use large companies or venture capitalists to fund our research. We protect our intellectual property with trade secrets rather than patents. We must stay out of the grips of the venture capitalists in order to protect our intellectual property.
Thus, at the outset of the SBIR project, the required rate of return for outside financing is not met. Had the expected rate of return exceeded that required rate of return to secure outside financing, the deal for outside financing could have been struck. But, uniformly, the respondents explain that at the outset of the SBIR, such funding could not be obtained. The SBIR award allows the SBIR project to proceed and ensures that socially valuable research is not lost because of imperfect financial markets, incomplete appropriability, and substantial downside risk. The required rate of return for the outside investors is simply not expected at the outset of the project. Now, as Phase II draws to an end for the sampled projects, upwards of a million dollars or much more has been spent to resolve uncertainties --technical and market uncertainties and also uncertainties about the small business doing the research. Now, after Phase I and Phase II, the logic of our construction of the expected cash flows below would not necessarily hold. The calculation of the lower bound for the social rates of return will use the information summarized in Table 10 ; the information was developed from the interviews that were conducted with the SBIR award winners. Some of the information is also available in the DoD files; however, the information was verified with the respondents and updated to reflect any changes from the DoD files. Variables for duration, total costs, and SBIR funding were combined into one figure for both Phase I and Phase II of the project. Typically there is an extra period of development after Phase II is completed and during which further work with prototypes and initial production lines is done. The length of that additional development period and the extra costs that the company would incur were obtained in the interviews.
Companies cannot expect to appropriate all of the value created by their innovations. First, the innovations will generate consumer surplus that no firm will appropriate, but that society will value. Our estimates of the social rate of return are conservative, because we do not attempt to estimate the value of consumer surplus generated by the SBIR projects. Second, some of the profits generated by the innovations will be captured by firms other than the innovators. Larger companies, for example, will observe the innovation and some will successfully imitate it and produce the commercial product in competition with the small business innovator. Respondents were asked to estimate the proportion of the returns generated by their anticipated innovation that they expected to capture. Then, in an extended conversation, other possible applications of the technology developed during the SBIR project were explored. The respondent was then asked to estimate the multiplier to get from the profit stream generated by the immediate applications of the SBIR project's technology to the stream of profits generated in the broader applications' markets that would reasonably be anticipated. Finally, the responding company estimated the proportion of the returns in those broader markets that it anticipated capturing. From the discussion, we were then able to estimate the proportion of value appropriated by the innovating SBIR award winner. The lower bound L for the average annual private return is found by solving equation (1) for L, because that will be the value for L such that the private firm just barely earns the hurdle, or required, rate of return on the portion of the total investment that the private firm must finance. The firm would not invest in the SBIR project unless it expected at least L for the average annual private return.
(1)
To find the upper bound U for the average annual private return, solve equation (2) for U, because any expected annual return greater than U would imply that the rate of return expected by the private firm would be more than its hurdle rate in the absence of SBIR funding, and therefore SBIR funding would not be required for the project.
Our estimate of the average expected annual private return to the firm is (L + U)/2. The average expected annual private return to the firm equals v times the average expected annual return that will be captured by all producers using the technology (producer surplus). Knowing the average expected annual private return is (L + U)/2 and knowing the portion of producer surplus that is appropriable, v, then total producer surplus equals (L + U)/2v and hence this value is a lower bound for the average expected annual social return. It is a lower bound because consumer surplus has not been measured.
The private expected rate of return without SBIR funding would be the solution to i in equation (3).
The lower bound on the social rate of return is found by solving equation (4) for i.
The private expected rate of return with SBIR funding would be the solution to i in equation (5). It seems clear that the Fast Track cases are much different than the non-Fast Track cases. Although they begin with a Phase I where a small business needs outside support, they exhibit sufficient commercial potential to attract outside funding quickly, and as a result these are likely to be projects that, relative to non-Fast Track projects, have higher lower bounds for social rates of return (recall that the social rates of return measure only producer, not consumer, surplus), and furthermore, because there will be more of the project investment cost paid by private funds, the private rates of return given SBIR support will be lower for the Fast Track projects. (1) One observation has a negative value for z because commercial returns started before the end of phase II. (2) Half of the respondents were uncomfortable estimating the private hurdle rate that outside financiers would apply to their projects at their outset. For those, the average value of r was used in the calculations. (3) One responded reported that T would be several decades, and another reported that T would be forever. In both of those cases, T was conservatively entered as the value 30 years. However, because the relevant discount rates are so high, the difference between 30 years and "forever" is not significant. In the integrals, the term with T entered negatively as an exponent would become zero, but with a large value of T, the term is very small in any case. 
IX. Conclusions
In all, the collection of fourteen New England SBIR projects studied here exhibited at the outset of Phase I high risk-both technical and market risk, high capital costs, and often a long-time expected before commercialization of the resulting technology. Comments suggest fairly substantial appropriability problems for some projects, even within the narrower applications of the technology. Appropriability problems are typically greater when broader potential applications are considered. Uniformly, in the absence of the SBIR funding, the research projects would not have been undertaken in the same way or at the same pace.
Not surprisingly, then, respondents reported that outside investors, at the outset of Phase I, would have required too high a rate of return to make it possible for the project to proceed with private financing. For example, one respondent reported that the outside investor wanted one-half of the rights to the profits for contributing one-third of the investment cost. Another reported that the outside financiers wanted so much of the company that he would have lost control of the company and ultimately of its intellectual property. Many other comments along those lines are provided in detail earlier in this paper.
The projects on the whole met both the funding agency's mission and the company's strategy. All fit the general scenario for socially valuable research projects that would have been underfunded in the absence of the SBIR Program. In particular, the projects appear to be ones for which the private rates of return in the absence of SBIR funding would have fallen short of the private hurdle rate required by outside financiers to whom the small businesses would have had to turn for financial support. Yet the social rates of returns to the projects are large and exceed the hurdle rates. The funding from the SBIR program changes the ordering of rates of return anticipated at the outset of Phase I. With the SBIR program providing funds, the expected private return relative to just the private portion of the total project costs is sufficient to move the private rate of return above the hurdle rate, and then the socially valuable research investment is undertaken.
In the foregoing ways, the Fast Track and non-Fast Track projects are essentially similar. Nonetheless, taken as a group the Fast Track projects show higher prospective expected lower-bound social rates of return-just as we would expect because the measure includes only expected profits to the innovator and other producers, rather than including consumer surplus as well. Thus, the Fast Track projects have higher expected private profits, and we expect that to be the case because these are the projects that attracted outside investors at an early stage in the research. Furthermore, the average duration of additional development beyond Phase II is somewhat less for the Fast Track projects, suggesting that at least on average they are somewhat closer to commercialization at the end of Phase II than the non-Fast Track projects.
The respondents and the rate of return calculations make clear that although the Fast Track program selects projects that are different from SBIR projects more generally, projects that do not qualify for the Fast Track designation are typically no less deserving of SBIR support, but rather are high-risk projects with potentially great social value that would go unfunded in the absence of the SBIR program. The respondents suggest that the Fast Track program is typically simply not useful for companies pursuing socially valuable high-risk research because at the end of Phase I, most such projects do not yet have the characteristics of projects that allow outside private investors to be attracted.
Finally, two things must be emphasized in conclusion. First, the high social rates of return estimated and reported for the SBIR projects are very conservative, lower bound estimates because they do not include consumer surplus in the benefit stream. Consider, for just one example, the non-Fast Track innovation of Materials Technologies that will allow safe, accurate, and efficient diagnostic tests of the wiring in airplanes. The profits that will be generated by the technology are obviously a tiny proper subset of the social benefits that the technology will generate, but the estimation method used measures only the returns in the form of profits to the innovator and to other producers of the technology. Second, some readers will be skeptical about the SBIR award recipients' earnest belief that without SBIR funding the projects would not have been undertaken or at least would not have been undertaken to the same extent or at the same speed. With the SBIR program in place, certainly the pursuit of SBIR funding would perhaps be a path of least resistance. However, if the research would have occurred without the public funding, the estimated upper bound and hence the average of the upper and lower bounds for expected private returns would be too low, and the actual lower bounds for the social rates of return would be even higher than we have estimated. Further, the gap between the social and private rates of return would remain, although that would not in itself justify public funding of the projects.
To summarize in a concise manner, Tables 15, 16, 17 and 18 provide an overview key findings about the Fast Track and non-Fast Track respondents. Table 19 provides additional insight by distinguishing the projects of BMDO where matching funds are required, although unlike Fast Track, the matching funds can come from the SBIR company itself. Fast-Track and BMDO-Matching SBIR projects are of shorter duration than other projects, even ignoring the gap between Phase I and Phase II. The additional period of development beyond the end of Phase II and until commercialization is less for Fast Track projects but more for BMDO-matching projects. The lower bound rate of return to society (including benefits to SBIR firm and its investors and also to other firms) is greater for Fast Track and BMDO-matching projects. In sum, Fast Track Projects take less time to reach commercialization; both Fast Track and BMDOmatching projects have more commercial potential in the sense that they are expected to generate greater returns to the SBIR firm and its investors and also to other firms. Further investigation, available on request from the author, showed that the qualitative differences among the projects remain the same when controls for technology categories are added in a regression model.
The conclusion is that the SBIR Program has funded innovative projects with high social rates of return that would not have been undertaken in the absence of the Program; further, the non-Fast Track as well as the Fast Track projects appear to be quite valuable, although they typically do not exhibit private commercial potential as quickly as the Fast Track projects. • A smaller proportion of Fast Track companies have had previous SBIR awards (3 of 6 vs. 6 of 7).
• A smaller proportion of Fast Track companies expressed difficulties bridging a gap in time between Phase I and Phase II (0 of 6 vs. 4 of 7).
• A larger proportion of Fast Track companies said that the SBIR award facilitated attracting outside investors (4 of 6 vs. 1 of 7).
• Fast Track projects show commercial potential earlier, and by the end of Phase I outside third-party investors are found.
• Fast Track projects have a higher lower bound for the social rate of return (based on the benefits for the collection of firms using the technology created by the SBIR project). • Barriers to investment (such as high technical risk and high capital costs) imply the need for partial public funding to carry out the SBIR projects.
• None of the companies have received ATP Awards.
• All of the companies expect long-run strategic benefits from the SBIR award in the form of increased company size (sales or employment) or a more diversified product line.
• The SBIR projects are socially valuable: the social rate of return > the rate of return needed for a worthwhile project. Fast Track Project Respondents • Encourage small businesses to acquire expertise to ensure proper business administration to go along with the competence in the scientific work.
• Merits of the SBIR Program should not be defined and based on nonmilitary commercialization because many valuable projects develop information with narrow applications within DoD.
• The Fast Track Program may cause worthwhile projects to have a low priority for Phase II awards simply because they entail research that does not by the end of Phase I reach the stage allowing outside funding to be attracted.
• Some SBIR projects appear to be the sort of routine R&D and procurement that used to be done at large companies. Fast Track is a great innovation because it puts money into truly innovative small business projects with a high chance of commercialization.
• A Phase III for developing manufacturing technology, for ramping up production, might be quite helpful given the difficulties negotiating the third party investments.
• Funding for a Mentor/Consultant as a part of Phase II, with the SBIR firm identifying in the Phase II proposal a large corporation or marketing consulting firm that would work with the SBIR firm during Phase II and provide expertise about commercializing the technology.
Non-Fast Track Project Respondents • Fast Track is not useful when the SBIR funding is needed to support high-risk research that does not result in a commercially viable technology before Phase II. Without having such an early result, attracting outside funding is not possible in time for a Fast Track award.
• Key technology need areas should be assigned to a lead agency which would fund all proposals in that area. There is agreement that improvements are needed in certain key technology areas. However, better coordination of the efforts of various agencies administering SBIR awards, each trying to achieve the same broad goals, is needed.
• Of the 25 pages in the application, only about five are needed for technical evaluation. The other 20 could be filed separately electronically and be used only in the event the application is being considered for an award.
• The SBIR Program could help to complete the process of commercialization.
Continuing support for a successful Phase II project, the SBIR Program could support a bridge to commercialization. The SBIR Program now is aimed at establishing technical feasibility, not commercial feasibility. John T. Scott
• Include Phase II funding for the DoD project monitor to travel to our location and interact with us. Ensure that the technical monitor is actively involved with the project.
• Allow Phase II funds to be spent over three or four years instead of just two years. 
